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interests test, it appears that respect for both the tenure system's opera-
tion and the fundamental fairness afforded the individual by due process
requires that a statement of reasons be given, and that a hearing be denied.
This is the result reached by the First Circuit in Drown.
7 3 Of the circuit
court decisions, only Drown appears to have understood the tenure system
in its proper role as a device for maintaining a qualified faculty, while at
the same time realizing that the system is alterable when the interest it
represents is outweighed by a conflicting individual interest. In view of its
mixed effect upon the tenure system, Drown is the most reasoned balanc-
ing of the governmental-private interests involved in this unresolved con-
troversy.
JERRY HENDRICK, JR.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: ITS APPLICATION AND
MISAPPLICATION
The often-stated purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to
conserve judicial time by preventing the relitigation of material issues of
fact already adjudicated in a prior suit.' It has commonly been held that
an issue which is "essential to the judgment" should be collaterally es-
topped from being relitigated, 2 and issues which come "collaterally in
question" or issues only "incidentally cognizable" should not be es-
topped.' The purpose of this distinction is to protect parties from being
prejudiced in future litigation by estoppel of issues that had not been
worth the cost or trouble of a vigorous defense in the first action, but
happen to be critical in the second.' However, if the issue was vitally
necessary to a particular judgment in the first action, it is assumed that
each party will have "put out his best efforts" in the defense, 5 and estop-
pel of this issue in a future action would surprise no one.
But while the purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be
clear, courts have been unable to develop a rule or standard that is either
"See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
'Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464,470 (1958). See also Partmar Corp. v. Paramount
Pictures Theatre Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954).
'See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942). See also Tait v. Western Md. Ry., 289
U.S. 620 (1933).





clear or universally applicable. Three factors appear to be primarily re-
sponsible for this problem: (1) policies in some areas of law distort or
require exceptionally restrictive applications of estoppel; (2) there exist
conflicting standards or "theories" governing the application of the doc-
trine; and (3) the theories themselves are difficult to apply by virtue of
their complexity or ambiguity.
RESTRICTION OF THE DOCTRINE IN VARIOUS FIELDS OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW
In many instances, the substantive law to which estoppel has been
applied has caused restrictive application of the doctrine by virtue of
policy considerations or the peculiar nature of the legal structure in that
area of the law.6 With the exception of some sensitive areas of federal pre-
emption such as antitrust law, where conclusive effect is not given to state
court adjudications, 7 most restrictions on the application of collateral
estoppel can be traced to the anomalies of administrative law8 or to areas
which have administrative characteristics or functions, such as patent or
tax law.
In tax law, for example, the particular concern of the courts is to
insure that equal treatment is given to all taxpayers of the particular class
taxed.9 The fear that members of the same class may be treated unequally
6E.g., United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927) (estoppel inapplicable
to customs cases); cf J. E. Bernard & Co. v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 496 (Cust. Ct.
1971).
7Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825
(1955). For the pre-emption effects on securities law see Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440
F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1971) and Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
'Until recently, many courts held that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply
to administrative agencies. E.g., Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir.
1947). That view is no longer generally held, particularly since the Supreme Court's ruling
in United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). There, the Court
rejected the absolute inapplicability of estoppel to administrative law, stating that "such
language is certainly too broad." 384 U.S. at 421-22. Most agencies and courts will attempt
to apply the doctrine unless there appears to be a good reason why they should not. See
Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 584, 281 F. Supp. 971 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
Sometimes the language is couched in terms of "sound discretion" or "flexibility." E.g.,
Matias Rivera v. Gardner, 286 F. Supp. 305 (D.P.R. 1968). Often courts will attempt to
consider a variety of factors militating for or against the use of estoppel. For example, they
may try to ascertain the type of administrative hearing held, the intentions of the administra-
tive body involved and the expectations of the parties before it, to determine whether estoppel
should apply to a particular agency decision. Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 309
F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y.) affd, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Tipler v. E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); Rush v. Gardner, 273 F. Supp. 753 (N.D.
Ga. 1967).
9Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).
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arises from the possibility that circumstances of fact or law may be dis-
similar or changed, even if only slightly, between actions. In such a situa-
tion a taxpayer who is estopped to relitigate a particular fact may then
be accorded a tax treatment dissimilar to that given others. 0 In addition,
a particular tax matter may recur in later years with barely perceptible
variations. The combined effect of the policies of equal tax treatment and
the often invariant nature of tax litigation seems to restrict the application
of collateral estoppel to obviously identical cases. This limitation virtually
eliminates the possibility that there may be changes or dissimilarities of
law or fact between actions and satisfies the requirement for the narrow
application of estoppel demanded in tax law.
An example of a more pronounced restriction on the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel can be found in patent law. There, a distinct limitation of
the doctrine seems to result from strong public policies of both encourag-
ing and protecting invention while, at the same time, eliminating ob-
viously invalid patents which may act as "scarecrows" to future inventors
who may be sued or threatened with suit." Collateral estoppel is disre-
garded in certain instances where it is felt that the public interst in thor-
oughly and completely ascertaining validity, even if it takes several litiga-
tions, is paramount to the interests of judicial economy. Thus, excepting
the case of obvious invalidity, any adjudication of patent validity must
be accompanied by a judgment of infringement for collateral estoppel to
apply.' 2 In such cases it is felt that if validity is superfluous to a judgment
of infringement, courts will be less likely to undertake a thorough analysis
of the complex issue of validity; 3 hence estoppel should rightly apply only
where validity is solely determinative of infringement.
Even though the Supreme Court in Electrical Fittings Corp. v.
Thomas & Betts Co." realized that estoppel effect would not be given to
incidental or moot findings of validity, it nevertheless held that such
findings should not be included in the decree of infringement. The purpose
of this holding was to prevent courts from casually giving plaintiffs a
highly persuasive precedent for use in future litigations against new defen-
dants or for threatening possible future defendants with suit. As a result
of this policy, courts will hesitate to rule on validity at all, unless the
patent is obviously invalid, where validity is not essential to a judgment
of infringement."
,old.
IWabash Corp. v. Ross Elec. Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 589-91 (2d Cir. 1951).
"Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1966;
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946).
13Note II supra.
"1307 U.S. 241 (1939).
"5See note II supra.
"6See Harries v. Air King Prod. Co., 183 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1950). There Judge Hand
called the issue "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the
whole paraphernalia of legal concepts." 183 F.2d at 162.
NOTES
In cases of obvious invalidity, however, a court which has concluded
that a patent is not infringed may also declare the patent invalid,17 even
though the issue is technically moot in light of the decree of non-
infringement. In a future infringement suit against the same parties or
privies, the determination of invalidity, although not "essential to the
judgment," will have conclusive estoppel effect. 8
Thus in patent law, special policy considerations compel courts both
to alter their applications of estoppel with regard to particular validity
issues, and to limit judgments in anticipation of possible future effects of
collateral estoppel. These restrictions of the doctrine are more drastic than
those in tax law, but the limitations on application in both fields illustrate
the strong impact of the forces of policy on the simple common-law
doctrine of estoppel.
THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING STANDARDS GOVERNING THE
APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL
The difficulty of applying collateral estoppel is compounded by the
tendency of courts to enunciate rules in terms of general applicability. For
example, Judge Learned Hand stated a seemingly broad doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel in a tax case, The Evergreens v. Nunan."9 In that case,
Judge Hand distinguished between two categories of fact: "ultimate"
facts, to which collateral estoppel traditionally applied, and "mediate
data," which were never given collateral estoppel effect.20 "Ultimate"
facts were defined as those "upon whose combined occurrence the law
raises the duty, or the right, in question,' '12 while "mediate data"
provided a rational inference of an ultimate fact.22 The court then re-
stricted the doctrine by stating that no fact established in the first action
would be estopped unless it was an "ultimate" fact in the second action. z3
Since the Evergreens statement is clearly appropriate in an area of
substantive law which demands a restrictive use of collateral estoppel,
some courts have found the rule too restrictive for general application.24
Dissatisfaction with Evergreens led to the adoption of a broader standard
in Hyman v. Regenstein,25 a patent assignment case. That case explicitly
'71d. at 162.
1"Note II supra.
19141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
21Id. at 928.
211t is important not to confuse "ultimate" facts with the ultimate issue of the case.
See I B.J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.442[2] (2d ed. 1965).
=Id.
2341 F.2d at 931.
2AE.g., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961). In this case, the court
questioned the validity of Evergreens' rigid rule, stating that its literal application to crimi-
nal law was "more likely to be found in law reviews than in life ... " 289 F.2d at 917.
21258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 913 (1959).
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rejected Evergreens,26 stating that an issue should be collaterally estopped
only if, in the first action, that issue was both necessary to the judgment
and foreseeably important in future litigation.2 7 This rule seems to focus
on preventing future prejudice to a losing party by a double test of "ne-
cessity" and "foreseeability." But the real difference between Hyman and
Evergreens, insofar as practical consequences are concerned, is that the
Hyman rule will allow mediate data to be used in a subsequent action, if
such use is foreseeable at the time of the first trial .2 This is a considerably
broader standard because it does not necessarily bar the use of estoppel
when circumstances of fact or law are different in the subsequent action.
The application of these two standards to a given fact situation could
therefore produce conflicting results.
2 9
The case of United States v. Kramer 0 clearly illustrates that these
standards or "theories" of application formulated in different areas of
substantive law can create diverse results when applied to the same fact
situation. Defendant had been acquitted on a charge of aiding and abet-
ting the robbery of a post office.3 It was determined that defendant had
not "participated" in any way. In a subsequent proceeding against defen-
dant for conspiracy in connection with the same robbery, he asserted that
collateral estoppel should apply to acquit him in the instant action, since
conspiracy implies participation, and the issue of participation had
previously been settled in his favor.32 The government argued, however,
that participation would be only mediate data in the conspiracy action,
and that collateral estoppel should not apply, by virtue of the Evergreens
doctrine.' But the court in Kramer cited the Hyman rule in full3 and held
2
1d. at 510-11.
2Id. at 511. The latter criterion was intimated in Evergreens as a possible better rule if
the law were "recast." 141 F.2d at 929.
28One might argue that an action is "foreseeable" if it grows out of the same transaction
or occurrence involving most or all of the same ultimate facts. In such a case, those ultimate
facts would be of importance in that subsequent action, being ultimate in that action as well.
But if the subsequent action grew out of a separate transaction or occurrence from the first
action, such that it constituted a totally new set of ultimate facts, then such action might
be deemed "unforeseeable." Consequently, it would be unforeseeable that the ultimate facts
of the first action would be used as evidence (mediate data) in a second, unrelated action,
and would not be estopped. Of course this reads much into the words "foreseeable" and
"importance" and also substitutes the equally vague terminology of "transaction or occurr-
ence."
2'Seegenerally F. James, Civil Procedure § 11.19 (1965).
3289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'g United States v. Kosmol, 173 F. Supp. 280
(E.D.N.Y. 1959).
1289 F.2d at 912.
32id.
11Id. at 916. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
ma289 F.2d at 917.
NOTES
that estoppel should apply, because the second charge grew out of the
"same transaction" as the first.3 The transaction test was apparently the
court's conception of what was "foreseeable" in applying estoppel."
The use of the broader Hyman rule does not seem unwarranted here
since the issues in each action are separate only to an extent that is
academic, and probably would be wasteful and perhaps unjust to reliti-
gate. If the court had not disapproved of the use of Evergreens in criminal
law, and had desired a contrary outcome, it could have applied the nar-
rower rule. That a court may have its choice of outcomes depending on
whether it desires a broad or narrow application of collateral estoppel is
a troublesome product of the co-existence of the two theories under the
same doctrinal label.
As a result of past confusion in the application of collateral estoppel,
and perhaps in an attempt to improve on the abstract categorizations of
Evergreens, the United States Supreme Court discussed its interpretation
of collateral estoppel in Commissioner v. Sunnen.37 This case, like
Evergreens, involved the question of the application of collateral estoppel
in tax law, and was concerned with the careful restriction of estoppel
where circumstances of fact or law have changed or are dissimilar between
actions. The Court strictly proscribed the use of facts which were essential
to the judgment in the first action in situations where the second case was
not identical to the first.3s But the Court expressed this ideal by saying:
[I]f the relevant facts in the two cases are separable, even though
they be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the
legal issues which recur in the second case. Thus the second pro-
ceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with,
but in a form separable from, the one dealt with in the first pro-
ceeding.
39
By identity of form, the Court indicated that it meant the "same set of
events or documents and the same bundle of legal principles" that con-
tributed to rendering the prior judgment.4 0 It is not surprising that this
language has itself led to some confusion as to how strictly the case should
be applied.4
3Id.
38See note 28 supra.




41See text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
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DIFFICULTIES IN THE APPLICATION OF AN ABSTRACT OR AMBIGUOUS
THEORY OF ESTOPPEL
Even when a court decides what estoppel rule it should use, there
remains the problem of applying it correctly to the case at hand. Difficul-
ties in understanding the terminology or wading through ambiguous lan-
guage which supposedly functions as the "test" of whether or not to use
the doctrine may lead to serious distortions of the estoppel doctrine."2
Moreover, courts must be careful in their analysis of a given fact situation
and in the application of estoppel principles. The New York case of
Hinchey v. Sellers43 is a good illustration of confused analysis in the
application of an abstract rule.
In Hinchey, plaintiffs decedents were killed in an auto accident in
New York. To establish the liability of the owner of the car in which the
decedent was killed, the plaintiff had to establish that the driver had
permission to use the car. In an earlier suit in New Hampshire to recover
from the owner's insurer, the court had held that the driver did not have
permission." The owner-defendant in the New York case sought to invoke
collateral estoppel as to that issue and thereby defeat the action. 5 The trial
court agreed with the defendants and granted their motion for summary
judgment. 6 The appellate division reversed,47 and cited Evergreens in
holding that "permission" in the New Hampshire case would be merely
mediate data in the New York action, and therefore collateral estoppel
should not apply.4 8
The court of appeals reversed, rejecting the idea that the New Hamp-
4 In addition to the problem of semantics there are related doctrines which, by their
associated terminology and conceptual resemblance to collateral estoppel, tend to become
confused with it on occasion. See Hyman v. Regenstein, 222 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1955). For
example, the concepts of bar and merger, the "cause of action," and the all-inclusive term
"res judicata" must be understood, if only for the purpose of knowing when not to apply
them, since the occasions for their use are somewhat similar. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDG-
MENTS §§ 45-49 (1942). Merger is a term applied to a judgment in plaintiff's favor which
prevents plaintiff from suing on the original cause of action or on issues which might have
been litigated, but were omitted from the original action; bar is applied to a judgment in
favor of defendant, and similarly "extinguishes" the cause of action, even to items of the
claim that were not in fact raised in the former action. Whenever bar, merger, or collateral
estoppel prevent reopening of a cause of action or relitigating an issue, the term "res
judicata" is used to describe the effect. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.9 (1965).
437 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
4"Hinchey v. National Sur. Co., 99 N.H. 373, 111 A.2d 827 (1955).
45Hinchey v. Sellers, I Misc. 2d 711, 147 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
4Id.
475 App. Div. 2d 440, 172 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1958).
'81d. at 441, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
NOTES
shire finding established merely mediate data. 9 Although its analysis was
somewhat confused, the court managed to make clear that it thought: (1)
the ultimate legal issues in the two cases were not identical, (2) "permis-
sion" was an ultimate fact in the New Hampshire case, and (3) the
"operative facts relating to permission" were the same in both cases.
Despite the use of the Hohfeldian "operative fact"50 which suggests a
parallel to Hand's "ultimate" fact, it seems that the court is really saying
in (3) that mediate data are the same in both cases.
The court's equation of the mediate data of the two cases led to the
application of collateral estoppel; however, the use of such mediate data
in the subsequent case is precisely what Evergreens sought to avoid. 51 Had
the court correctly seen that the ultimate facts were separable, due to the
dissimilarity of the legal surroundings, it probably would have rejected
application of the doctrine.
Like Evergreens, the language in Sunnen has met with varying inter-
pretations. For example, where a warranty offer had been interpreted as
a "price adjustment" for tax purposes in a prior suit,5 2 the Tax Court,
citing Sunnen, refused to apply collateral estoppel to that ultimate holding
in the year following the suit because "distinct and separate transactions"
were involved.5 But the warranty offers, which were the basis of judgment
in each case, had not been changed between actions. In another case
involving repetitious claims,54 the Tax Court found that since the court's
previous determination that taxpayer was transferring his partnership
assets to his daughter there had been no change of material facts.5 5 Collat-
eral estoppel was invoked since this apparently was the same question
which had confronted the Tax Court before. However, in the Tax Court's
zeal to compare only the "events and legal principles" of the two actions,
it had overlooked the possibility that circumstances might have changed
since the last action,56 even though the "forms" of the actions were identi-
cal.
v7 N.Y.2d at 293, 165 N.E.2d at 159, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
OSee W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONs 32-35 (1923).
51See text accompanying note 23 supra. The dissent in Hinchey apparently perceived
the message of Evergreens correctly and concluded that collateral estoppel should not apply.
It urged that the facts surrounding "permission" in Pennsylvania contract law constituted
an entirely different question from "permission" under the New York traffic laws, in which
the particular factors of public policy and legislative intent were relevant. Hinchey v. Sellers,
7 N.Y.2d 287, 298, 165 N.E.2d 156, 162, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
52Philco Corp. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
0Id. at 894. After rejecting the collateral estoppel doctrine the court indicated that stare
decisis may still be used.
mAlexander v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 318 (1954), rev'd in part, 224 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1955).
"22 T.C. at 320.
"6See Alexander v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 1955).
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Thus these two tax cases seem to take Sunnen too literally in the first
instance, and to miss the focus of the case altogether in the second." The
latter misapplication appears particularly unfortunate since the thrust of
the Sunnen opinion seems clearly to bar the use of collateral estoppel in
the second action if legal or factual circumstances have in fact changed.58
One might speculate that the abstract nature and ambiguity of the
estoppel rules exemplified herein result from the attempt to limit estoppel
application to accomodate policy restrictions. Certainly the Hyman rule
of "foreseeability," which is neither derived from tax law nor concerned
with restricting the doctrine,59 is simpler. But one still must clarify "fore-
seeabiljty" to make it workable, and if this could be done, it would be at
the risk of establishing another complex and fragile semantic structure,
not unlike that of Evergreens or Sunnen.60
CONCLUSION
In summary it may be said that several factors militate against deve-
lopment of a clear rule of universal application for collateral estoppel: the
policies in some areas of law require highly restrictive application of
estoppel, and the rules developed to accomodate these restrictions may
create diverse or unjust results when applied in other fields of law in which
those policies are absent. Moreover, the estoppel rules or standards with
which a court must work are usually ambiguous and difficult to apply in
all but the simplest fact situations.
Perhaps a greater appreciation of the fact that an estoppel theory
suitable to one area of law may be quite unsuitable to another might
ensure that courts give consideration to (1) the real distinctions of fact and
law that may exist between actions, and (2) the consequences that may
follow from a broad or narrow application of estoppel in light of (3) the
underlying policy concerns of the law in the case at hand. Judicial focus
on these elements, particular to each case and to each area of law, might
also reduce time spent finding and attempting to fit facts into narrow and
often ambiguous semantic categories.
DOUGLAS W. MACDOUGAL
57For a good discussion of the problems courts have had with the Sunnen case, see
Branscomb, Collateral Estoppel in Tax Cases: Static and Separable Facts, 37 TEXAs L. REv.
584 (1959). The author indicated that tax courts are troubled by the application of collateral
estoppel in two situations: first, where there has been a recurrence of an act or event
previously considered in an earlier action (where there may now be dissimilarity); second,
where there has been a continuing relation which the court must examine for the possibility
of change from year to year. Both types of cases are discussed in text accompanying notes
52-56 supra.
I See text accompanying note 39 supra. The word "separable" should be interpreted
to mean changed with time or in dissimilar factual or legal surroundings.
5See text accompanying note 28 supra.
6 See note 28 supra.
